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Acts	According	to	Hyman	
	
JENNIFER	HORNSBY	
Birkbeck.	University	of	London	
	
John	Hyman’s	Action,	Knowledge,	and	Will	is	richly	historically	informed,	replete	with	vibrant	
examples,	full	of	ideas,	and	a	pleasure	to	read.	The	idea	that	determines	how	the	book	proceeds	is	
that	‘a	convincing	philosophy	of	action	needs	to	disaggregate	the	four	different	dimensions	of	
human	action’—‘the	physical,	the	ethical,	the	psychological	and	the	intellectual’.	It	is	indicative	of	
the	book’s	breadth	that	it	treats	of	all	these	dimensions;	and	one	doesn’t	need	to	agree	that	
disaggregation	of	the	sort	Hyman	means	to	implement	can	be	effected	in	order	to	find	the	breadth	
very	welcome.	In	what	follows,	I’ll	be	concerned	with	what	some	might	think	of	as	a	fifth	
dimension—the	metaphysical.	Specifically,	I’ll	be	concerned	with	whether	Hyman’s	view	of	acts	as	
causings	can	accommodate	what	is	said	when	action	verbs	are	used	with	imperfect	aspect—as	when	
it’s	said,	for	instance,	that	John	is	raising	the	flag	or	was	raising	the	flag	(rather	than	that	John	raised	
the	flag,	where	‘raised’	has	perfect	aspect).	
Hyman	defines	an	act	as	‘an	instance	of	an	agent’s	causing	some	kind	of	change’	(p.43),	and	
often	calls	the	event	or	change	which	an	act	is	an	instance	of	an	agent’s	causing	a	result.	He	thinks	
that	acts	are	particulars—‘doubly	dependent	particulars’,	inasmuch	as	the	identity	of	any	act	
depends	both	upon	the	event	of	which	it	is	the	causing	and	upon	the	substance	that	undergoes	the	
change.	(This	double	dependence,	he	says,	‘does	not	prevent	us	from	including	acts	[along	with]	
events	and	substances,	in	Quine’s	super	category	of	‘“objects”,	an	object	being	“the	material	
content	of	a	portion	of	space-time”’	(p.61).)	Hyman	rounds	off	his	discussion	of	acts	and	events	
saying	that	acts	are	‘excluded	from	[the	category	of	relations]	because	they	are	dynamic	rather	than	
static’	(p.74–5).	When	he	calls	acts	dynamic,	I	take	Hyman	to	mean	to	allow	that	acts	may	be,	or	may	
have	been,	ongoing—in	progress.	And	I	take	him	to	be	alert	to	a	possible	problem	about	allowing	
this	when	he	says:	
the	fact	that	one	can	fail	to	complete	an	act	is	sometimes	thought	to	require	a	qualification	of	the	
idea	that	to	act	is	to	cause	a	certain	kind	of	change.	(n.	at	p.34)		
I’ll	suggest	that	there	may	be	a	genuine	problem	here.	I’ll	go	on	to	suggest	that	no-one	really	thinks	
that	acts	themselves	are	included	in	the	category	of	relations.	Hyman’s	real	opponent	here,	I	think,	is	
someone	who	wants	to	allow	that	relational	predications	may	be	made	with	action	verbs.	
In	‘fail	to	complete	an	act’,	‘an	act’	apparently	has	to	be	taken	to	be	something	“telic”:	reaching	
an	end—a	sort	of	result—amounts	to	the	act’s	completion.	‘Swimming	the	Hellespont	is	an	act’,	
Hyman	says	(p.34).	He	also	says	that	‘“Byron	swam	the	Hellespont”	reports	an	act’	(p.35).	But	the	act	
reported	by	this	sentence	about	Byron	presumably	is	a	particular	(which	some	will	take	to	be	an	
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“object”	in	Quine’s	super-categorial	sense),	whereas	swimming	the	Hellespont—completed	by	all	
who’ve	swum	the	Hellespont	and	attempted	by	those	who	were	(/are)	swimming	the	Hellespont	but	
who	did	not	(/may	not)	succeed	in	getting	across—is	surely	not	a	particular,	not	an	instance	of	
anything.	Let	me	call	swimming	the	Hellespont	an	ACT.	Then	an	act	in	the	sense	of	Hyman’s	
definition—‘an	instance	of	an	agent’s	causing	…’—may	be	thought	of	as	something	there	is	when	an	
ACT	has	actually	been	instanced	by	an	agent.	
Consider	one	of	Hyman’s	examples	apparently	well-suited	to	the	view	of	acts	as	causings.	‘“Paul	
melted	the	butter”	reports	an	act’	(p.35).	The	act	in	question	is	Paul’s	causing	of	a	certain	result—of	
the	butter’s	being	molten.	Contrast	‘Paul	was	melting	the	butter’.	This	apparently	does	not	report	an	
act	in	Hyman’s	sense:	unless	and	until	the	butter	came	to	be	molten	there	was	no	result	of	the	
butter’s	being	molten	to	be	Paul’s	causing	of.	If	one	wants	an	example	of	‘the	fact	that	one	can	fail	
to	complete	an	act’,	then	one	might	imagine	that	the	phone	rang	just	after	Paul	had	set	out	on	
getting	the	butter	melted	and	that	Paul	then	abandoned	the	project	of	making	a	sauce	for	which	he	
needed	molten	butter.	But	there	is	no	need	to	contrive	such	an	example	in	order	to	raise	a	question	
about	how	‘Paul	was	melting	the	butter’	may	be	supposed	to	be	understood.		
Let	me	now	quote,	and	proceed	to	comment	on,	the	passage	which	contains	Hyman’s	response	
to	‘what	it	sometimes	thought’.	
[O]ne	can	be	engaged	for	a	time	in	drying	a	plate	without	completing	the	task.	But	it	is	argued	that	
one	cannot	properly	be	said	to	be	engaged	in	causing	(as	opposed	to	attempting	to	cause)	a	plate	to	
become	dry	unless	this	result	occurs.	If	that	is	right,	then	we	cannot	infer	from	the	fact	that	to	do	an	
act	of	a	certain	kind	is	to	cause	a	change	of	the	corresponding	kind	to	the	fact	that	to	be	doing	an	act	
of	the	same	kind	is	to	be	causing	a	change	of	the	corresponding	kind.	(n.	at	p.34	contd.)	
For	the	sake	of	concreteness,	suppose	that	Ann	is	now	engaged	in	such	activity	on	her	part	as	it	
takes	for	some	plate	to	be	becoming	dry.	The	opponent	Hyman	envisages	here	will	argue	that	Ann’s	
being	thus	engaged	cannot	really	be	a	matter	of	her	causing	the	plate’s	becoming	dry	because	there	
won’t	be	a	result	of	the	kind	required	for	an	act	of	drying	the	plate	unless	Ann	completes	the	task.	
That	seems	right:	so	long	as	she	is	drying	the	plate,	there	is	as	yet	no	result.	One	might	wonder	now	
why	it	should	matter	whether	or	not	Ann	will	complete	the	task—will	actually	finish	drying	the	plate.	
Even	if	Ann	will	carry	on	and	finish,	so	long	as	she	is	drying	the	plate—is	engaged	in	doing	so—there	
is	no	result,	no	‘event	or	change’.	Indeed	it	can	seem	not	to	matter	whether	or	not	‘dry	the	plate’	is	
interpreted	as	“telic”.	Irrespective	of	how	dry	the	plate	has	come	to	be	when	Ann	stops	drying	it,	
Ann’s	activity	appears	not	to	have	any	result	until	she	stops.		
Hyman	suggests	that	any	difficulty	here	will	go	away	if	a	certain	inference	is	disallowed.	In	order	
to	find	the	inference	faulty	(to	find	that	‘we	cannot	infer	…’),	one	needs	to	accept	that	‘to	do	an	ACT’	
can	be	understood	using	‘cause	to	..’,	but	refuse	to	allow	that	‘to	be	doing	an	ACT’	can	be	similarly	
understood.	Well,	what	is	it	‘to	do	an	ACT’?	Suppose	the	ACT	is	V-ing—drying	a	plate,	melting	the	
butter,	swimming	the	Hellespont,	whatever.	Presumably	to	do	it	is	to	V—to	dry	a	plate,	to	melt	the	
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butter,	..	.	It	is	hard	then	to	see	how	to	be	doing	it	could	be	anything	other	than	to	be	V-ing;	and	then	
it	doesn’t	seem	possible	to	agree	with	Hyman	that	to	dry	the	plate	is	to	cause	a	certain	change,	yet	
to	deny,	as	Hyman	would	like	to	be	able	to,	that	to	be	drying	the	plate	is	to	be	causing	such	a	
change.	Of	course	Hyman	has	reasons	for	‘insisting	‘that	to	raise,	move,	..	dry,..etc.,	something	is	to	
cause	it	to	rise,	move,	..	become	dry,	..etc’(pp.36–37).1	In	presenting	his	view,	he	uses	only	
unmarked	infinitives.	But	given	that	acts	take	time,	I	assume	that	he	is	committed	to	both	
imperfective	and	perfective	versions,	so	that	he	should	endorse	both	(i)	to	be	raising	(moving,	
drying,	..)	X	is	to	be	causing	X	to	rise	(move,	become	dry,	..),	and	(ii)	to	have	raised	(moved,	dried,	..)	
X	is	to	have	caused	X	to	move	(rise,	become	dry,	..).		
If	there	is	a	problem	here,	it	may	not	be	a	problem	specifically	about	the	‘cause	to	—–’	glosses	
which	Hyman	uses	to	understand	a	range	of	transitive	verbs	which	have	intransitive	counterparts—
‘move’,	etc.	etc.	Perhaps	the	explicitly	causative	treatment	of	‘A	is	moving	X’,	with	its	introduction	of	
results,	simply	brings	attention	to	a	problem	about	the	imperfective,	a	problem	that	there	seems	to	
be	whether	or	not	A’s	ongoing	moving	of	X	is	said	to	be	A’s	causing	of	something.	If	X’s	ongoing	
moving,	when	A	is	moving	X,	is	not	itself	an	event	or	change,	then	equally	it	seems	that	A’s	ongoing	
moving	of	X	is	not	itself	a	particular—never	mind	whether	it	is	correctly	described	as	‘a	causing’.	But	
however	that	may	be,	the	‘cause	to—–’	glosses	can	seem	to	be	objectionable	in	their	own	right.	
Suppose	that	John	set	his	plate	drying	machine	to	start	in	five	minutes’	time.	One	might	think	that	in	
this	case	it	was	the	machine,	not	John,	that	dried	the	plate;	and	that	here	John	did	cause	the	plate	to	
dry:	he	did	so	by	setting	the	machine.	It	is	then	a	question	whether	the	word	‘cause’	as	it	occurs	in	
‘John	caused	..’	in	this	example,	also	has	application	to	someone	who	simply	dried	the	plate	
herself—who	did	so	‘directly’	to	use	Hyman’s	term.	Hyman	argues	that	the	fact	that	we	would	not	
actually	say	of	someone	who	had	directly	dried	a	plate	that	she	had	caused	it	to	become	dry	can	be	
explained	on	Gricean	principles	(p.37).	But	given	that	we	understand	‘cause	X	to	––’	perfectly	well	
when	it	would	actually	be	used	with	a	person	(or	other	substance)	as	subject,	it	must	be	a	question	
whether	this	word	means	what	it	would	need	to	mean	if	Hyman	were	right	to	equate	‘to	raise	
(move,	..)	X’	with	‘to	cause	X	to	rise	(move,	..)’.	One	finds	a	reason	to	doubt	the	equation	by	
considering	that	if	‘raise	X’	meant	‘cause	X	to	rise’,	then	one	would	expect	‘John	raised	the	flag	
slowly’	to	be	equivalent	to	‘John	caused	the	flag	to	rise	slowly’.	But	the	latter	sentence	conveys	that	
the	flag’s	rising	was	slow.	It	doesn’t	convey,	as	the	former	does,	that	John	did	something	slowly.	One	
																																								 																				
1		 Hyman’s	reason	is	that	‘this	is	the	most	plausible	way	of	explaining	what	these	verbs	mean’	(p.37).	It	will	
be	evident	that	I	think	that	the	tense	and	aspectual	behaviour	of	verbs	needs	to	be	brought	into	account	in	
explaining	what	they	mean.	This	has	to	be	my	excuse	for	scrutinizing	a	matter	which	Hyman,	despite	his	
distinguishing	activities	from	acts	(p.34),	confines	to	a	footnote.			
I	should	say	that	Hyman	has	a	distinctive	view	of	acts,	and	provides	careful	arguments	which	succeed	in	
ruling	out	a	number	of	alternatives.	One	such	alternative	that	he	refutes	is	taken	from	Hornsby	(1980):	
there	I	presented	a	view	that	I’ve	long	since	abandoned.	
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might	think	that	if	John	raised	the	flag	slowly	(and	didn’t	cause	it	to	rise	slowly),	then	the	flag’s	rising	
and	John’s	raising	it	must	alike	have	been	slow.	And	then	one	might	think	that	the	flag’s	rising	simply	
was	its	being	raised	by	John.	
This	isn’t	what	Hyman	thinks.	He	defends	a	distinction	between	an	agent’s	raising	a	flag	and	the	
motion	of	the	flag,	saying	that	‘we	can	cut	the	agent	out	of	the	picture,	so	to	speak’	(p.56).	Well,	
certainly	the	motion	of	the	flag	can	be	thought	about	separately	from	whoever	raises	it.	But	the	fact	
that	there	is	no	need	to	think	about	(or	see)	an	agent	in	order	to	think	about	(or	see)	the	flag’s	being	
raised	can	hardly	show	that	the	rising	of	the	particular	flag	that	there	was	when	John	raised	that	flag	
was	not	that	flag’s	being	raised	by	John.	(Compare:	although	there	no	need	to	know	which	child	left	
her	tooth	under	the	pillow,	and	no	need	to	see	Rosie	when	one	sees	the	tooth	left	under	the	pillow,	
still	if	it	was	Rosie’s	tooth	that	one	saw,	what	one	saw	could	not	have	been	the	tooth	of	another	
child.)	Despite	Hyman’s	wanting	to	distinguish	action	from	motion	where	someone’s	raising	the	flag	
is	concerned,	he	says	in	due	course,	that	‘Brutus	killed	Caesar’	and	‘Caesar	was	killed	by	Brutus’	
‘refer	to	the	same	act’	(p.71).	If	one	agrees,	then	one	will	surely	think	that	‘John	raised	the	flag’	and	
‘The	flag	was	raised	by	John’	likewise	“refer	to	the	same	act”.	And	if	one	further	thinks	that	the	flag’s	
rising	when	John	raised	it	is	was	its	being	raised	by	John,	then	one	will	dissent	from	the	idea	that	
John	stood	in	any	“causing”	relation	to	an	event	or	result	while	the	flag	was	going	up.	(Of	course	one	
may	still	find	causal	notions	appropriate.	If	it	is	asked	‘Who	has	caused	the	flag	to	be	flying’,	the	
answer	is	‘John’.	John	was	responsible	for	the	flag’s	motion	so	long	as	he	was	raising	it.	The	wind	is	
(/was)	responsible	for	the	door’s	being	open	if	it	is	blowing	(/blew)	the	door	open.	It	seems	possible	
to	resist	Hyman’s	view	that	acts	are	causings	without	thinking	it	an	accident	that	a	range	of	transitive	
verbs	are	called	causatives.)	
When	Hyman	treats	acts	as	referred	to	by	sentences,	he	apparently	takes	on	a	new	
understanding	of	‘acts’.	At	least,	when	he	turns	to	his	argument	that	‘acts	are	excluded	from	the	
category	of	relations’,	he	imagines	neither	an	opponent	who	would	claim	that	melting	the	butter	
(which	I	have	labelled	an	‘ACT’)	is	a	relation,	nor	an	opponent	who	would	claim	that	what	is	reported	
by	the	sentence	‘Paul	melted	the	butter’	is	a	relation.	Those	claims	both	seem	very	implausible,	and	I	
doubt	they	could	really	be	at	issue.	Hyman’s	argument	at	this	point	depends	upon	distinguishing	the	
pair	‘Brutus	is	older	than	Caesar’	and	‘Caesar	is	younger	than	Brutus’	from	such	a	pair	as	‘Brutus	
killed	Caesar’	and	‘Caesar	was	killed	by	Brutus’.	The	former	pair	he	says	‘refer	..	to	converse	
relations’,	whereas	the	latter	pair	‘evidently	refer	to	one	and	the	same	act’	(p.71).	The	idea	then,	is	
that	if	one	grants	the	arguments	Hyman	gives	against	the	view	that	converse	relations	are	identical,	
one	must	accept	that	the	behaviour	of	‘killed’	cannot	be	assimilated	to	that	of	‘is	older	than’.	Well,	
Hyman’s	opponent	isn’t	likely	to	say	that	sentences,	whether	they	report	how	one	thing	acted	upon	
another	or	they	report	how	one	thing	stands	to	another,	refer	to	relations.	Surely	what	Hyman’s	
opponent	would	wish	to	claim	is	that	such	sentences	as	‘Brutus	killed	Caesar’	or	‘Paul	melted	the	
butter’,	like	the	sentences	‘Brutus	is	older	than	Caesar’	or	‘Block	a	sits	on	top	of	block	b’,	contain	
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expressions	for	relations.	So	‘Brutus	is	older	than	Caesar’	conveys	that	Brutus	and	Caesar	stand	
respectively	in	the	relation	in	which	any	two	things	stand	if	the	first	is	older	than	the	second.	
Likewise,	according	to	one	whom	I	think	we	have	to	take	to	be	Hyman’s	real	opponent,	‘Paul	melted	
the	butter’	conveys	that	Paul	and	the	butter	stand	respectively	in	the	relation	that	any	two	things	
stand	if	the	first	melted	the	second.	Here	there	is	no	claim	that	an	act	in	any	sense	is	a	relation.	The	
claim	is	that	the	two-place	predicate	‘melted’	expresses	a	relation.	And	given	Hyman’s	view	about	
pairs	on	the	pattern	of	‘A	φ-d	B’	and	‘B	was	φ-d	by	A’,	one	wonders	why	he	should	find	the	category	
of	relation	out	of	place	here.	(I	think	that	one	might	now	set	aside	disputes	about	whether	relations	
are	identical	with	their	converses.	Even	if	it	is	said	that	different	relations	are	expressed	in	‘Brutus	is	
older	than	Caesar’	and	‘Caesar	is	younger	than	Brutus’,	still	it	can	be	agreed	that	the	truth	of	the	one	
is	necessary	and	sufficient	for	the	truth	of	the	other.	So	it	is,	as	Hyman	agrees,	with	‘Brutus	killed	
Caesar’	and	‘Caesar	was	killed	by	Brutus’,	and	presumably,	generally	now,	with	‘A	φ-d	X’	and	‘X	was	
φ-d	by	A’.)	
When	Hyman	concludes	that	‘acts	are	excluded	from	the	category	of	relations’,	he	explains	why	
this	should	be	so.	It	is	here	that	he	says	about	acts	that	they	are	‘dynamic	rather	than	static’.	The	
dynamic	character	of	acts	is	now	brought	out	in	the	fact	that	we	can	ask	(e.g.)	how	long	it	took	for	
Paul	to	melt	the	butter.	Indeed	we	can	ask	this.	Paul	was	melting	the	butter	for	as	long	as	it	took	for	
Paul	to	melt	the	butter.	But	then	it	seems	that	we	must	say	that	‘is	melting’	and	‘was	melting’,	like	
‘melted’,	express	relations.	‘A	is	(/was)	melting	X’	conveys	that	A	and	X	stand	respectively	in	the	
relation	that	any	two	things	stand	if	the	first	is	(/was)	melting	the	second.	And	of	course	neither	of	A	
or	X,	participants	in	an	ongoing	process,	can	be	static	throughout	the	time	when	A	is	acting	on	X.	
(Acting	on	here	might	be	thought	to	be	a	causal	notion	without	being	thought	to	be	a	notion	having	
causing	as	a	constituent.	So	I	suggested	it	could	be	with	causative	transitive	verbs.)	
